Awareness of the morally significant distinction between research and innovative therapy reveals serious gaps in the legal provision for compensation in the UKfor injured subjects of medical research. Major problems are limitations inherent in negligence actions and a culture that emphasises indemnifying researchers before compensating victims. Medical research morally requires compensation on a no-fault basis even where there is proper consent on the part of the research subject. In particular, for drug research, there is insufficient provision in the current patient guidelines of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, since they make "no legal commitment" to paying compensation for injury to patient subjects. There is a needfor the provision of both adequate insurance and contractual arrangements for making payments. The solution is for Local Research Ethics Committees (LRECs) to make use of their power to withhold approval of medical research where compensation is not legally enforceable.
Definition of research and the general principles THE DEFINITION OF RESEARCH
We might begin with the Oxford English Dictionary's definition. "Research" is there defined as "An investigation directed to the discovery of some fact by careful study of a subject; a course of critical or scientific discovery". The important point is that it is accompanied by an intention to further knowledge, irrespective of benefit to the subject. This where it is justifiable to use some less orthodox treatment; in such cases, the experimental spin-off is only secondary to the intention to benefit the patient. Research therefore begins where benefit to the patient becomes only secondary. It is therefore different from innovative therapy, where the aim is "entirely for the benefit of a particular individual patient".2 Although not clearly established in English law, Canadian law clearly accepts the distinction: Zimmer v Ringrose.3 As the RCP points out, innovative treatment may become part of medical practice without becoming the subject of formal research.
THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE BENEFIT TO OTHERS
This is an important justification for energetically pursuing medical research. But it essentially means that research subjects are being used for the benefit of others; a point not to be overshadowed by the 
The availability of compensation in practice arises predominantly through two sources; the so-called National Health Service (NHS) indemnity and through medical insurance associations. As far as the NHS is concerned, recent arrangements protect NHS employees from claims in negligence in performing local health authority duties of which, for many, research is one.'0 It should be noted that the trusts are required to pay any claims out of their own resources, although there is provision for trusts to be given loans from the regional health authority for this purpose. But the NHS does not cover the nonnegligent cases other than through the unwieldy and uncertain ex gratia payments which the NHS is empowered to make subject to DoH and Treasury approval." It is important to see how the indemnity is viewed by the DoH. The guidelines which introduce the new arrangements speak exclusively in terms of how payments for claims are to be divided between the health authority and other bodies such as sponsoring institutional or corporate bodies and not in terms of compensation to an injured party. Indeed, the culture of thinking about compensation is weighted towards the protection of the researcher, etc, rather than towards the protection of the injured party. Evidence, for example, is in the DoH's 1991 guidance for LRECs which contemplates that members should not be indemnified for "gross negligence".'2 This is a clear indication that the circular did not consider compensation for the injured subject as the paramount principle because it would follow that if the LREC were grossly negligent there would not be DoH financial backing and so nothing by way of compensation.
Outside the NHS, institutions such as the Medical Defence Union and a number of other such associations (nurses, physiotherapists, dentists, etc) protect their members against events widely characterised as "legal liability". The question of compensation thereby centres naturally on the extent of the researchers' professional obligations to their patients and, where applicable, to their research subjects. In practice, the MDU and other associations assume the responsibility for a member's legal liability and indemnify the member for the costs. As with the NHS, although perhaps more understandably, the emphasis lies on indemnifying the member rather than protecting an injured party.
THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1987
The notorious difficulty with establishing liability is the "state of the art" defence which the act incorporates,'3 a particularly pressing problem when the whole point of the medical research is to determine facts which necessarily go beyond what is currently part of "the state of the art". In the case where the product is "defective", and has caused harm, there is entitlement to compensation under the act. An advantage is that the liability is strict, that is, is not at first sight dependent on fault on the part of the producer although there is perhaps a fault element in proving that a product is defective. But For drug research on healthy volunteers, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) recommends to its members that no-fault liability "in the event of injury" and on proof of causation, should be accepted by the sponsoring company as part of a legally binding contract between the researcher (acting as agent for the company) and the subject.'4 ABPI guidelines for patients On the other hand, the ABPI recommends members to compensate patient subjects of research for "more serious injury of an enduring and disabling character (including exacerbation of an existing condition) and not for temporary pain or discomfort or less serious or curable complaints", on a no-fault basis although "without legal commitment".'5 Perhaps reasonably they restrict liability to pre-marketed drugs or marketed medical medicines which are being tested for use other than that in the product licence. Clearly, these guidelines are intended (unlike the healthy volunteer guidelines) not to have legal force and it would be difficult to establish a contract in the absence of an express agreement with the patient. Particularly, it would be almost impossible to establish the necessary "contractual intention" because of the "without legal commitment" wording. The ABPI has met with criticism of this provision but maintains that its members would in reality pay out; that the cases are rare; and that there are problems inherent in establishing a legal contract with a patient, such as the compos mentis of the patient and the special doctor/patient relationship. '6 These three arguments are not particularly strong. Committees broadly cover NHS research within their geographical area, and non-NHS research submitted by agreement, and they are to be regarded as independent ("not beholden to" the NHS bodies). The important (indeed, crucial) point is that "No NHS body should agree to a research proposal without the approval of the relevant LREC" and so approval can be made conditional upon compensation. 9 It is within the power of a LREC, therefore, to make its consent to research conditional upon adequate compensation arrangements being in place. The statement in the RCP guidelines that "there is little that RECs can do" about the unsatisfactory situation regarding compensation is therefore false.20
The power to require compensation, too, is frequently exercised and evidence for this is the common practice of LRECs to make it a requirement that sponsoring companies which are not members of the ABPI should comply with the ABPI guidelines.
Should 
